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1. RATIONALE FOR SELECTING THE THEME AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
Situated on the boundary of two large political spheres of interests – between the European 
Union, dynamically enlarging its territory but having energy sector vulnerabilities and Russia, 
seeking to retain and/or increase its power positions – and as part of the former, Hungary 
seeks to minimise its natural gas supply security risks by, among other things, diversifying its 
imports infrastructure. 
Budapest has found itself caught in the middle of a large-scale international struggle in the 
case of alternative line construction projects, which has gone down as the “Nabucco vs. South 
Stream” debate in the public mind. Although there may appear to be economic considerations 
at the bottom of the conflict, the discourse shows a typical foreign policy dimension pointing 
beyond economic policy concerns. 
In my doctoral thesis, I will give a historical overview of the discourse over Hungary’s 
dependence on Russian gas supplies and analyse the “Nabucco vs. South Stream” debate in 
the light of nation state sovereignty; European integration; and Russian imperialism. The 
constructivist underpinnings of these three aspects follow a triple division. 
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION AND 
SOVEREIGNTY
SOVIET/RUSSIAN 
IMPERIALISM AND 
SOVEREIGNTY
EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION
IN THE GAS 
SECTOR
SOVIET/RUSSIAN 
IMPERIALISM
IN THE GAS
SECTOR
„NABUCCO VS. SOUTH 
STREAM”
DEBATE
IN HUNGARY
(2006-2012)
 
Figure 1 Thesis structure 
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In the first third of my thesis I will seek an answer to what historical processes gave context 
to the emergence and changes of different political discourses over sovereignty. It is 
followed by a shift in the focus of discussion from nation state sovereignty; European 
integration; and Russian imperialism to the issue of natural gas supply security. Finally, in 
the third large block I will analyse events between 1
st
 January 2006 and 31
st
 December 2012 
in the light of the “Nabucco vs. South Stream” debate. 
I will first operationalise nation state sovereignty. I will explore historical changes of the 
concept and prevailing European views of it (II. 1). 
In laying down the historical underpinnings of the internal and external aspects of sovereignty 
I will present seminal theories of sovereignty in political philosophy and the history of ideas 
and their changes from the middle ages to the 20
th
 century (II. 1.1; II. 1.2).
1
  
That will be followed by a historical overview of the process of European unification (II. 2). 
The history of the European Union will be discussed by way of introducing different 
integration theories. The next chapter (II. 3) will focus on the historical relationship between 
Russian imperialism and the concept of sovereignty. 
In the second third of my thesis, I will examine the evolution of the hydrocarbon policies of the 
EC; EEC (later European Union); and the Soviet Union/Russia, with special regard to the 
natural gas sector (III. 1–2). 
In the final third of the thesis (IV), I will cover the period 1
st
 January 2006 – 31st December 
2012 discussing the processes of accelerating European integration and Russian cooperation in 
conjunction, with a special focus on the “Nabucco vs. South Stream” debate. 
2. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK  
The point of departure of my research is the fact that nation states continue to remain the 
key actors in international relations seeking to preserve/maximise their own security by 
diversifying natural gas imports. Understandably, however, these states seek to accomplish 
                                                 
1
 In terms of the methodology of the approach, I will follow the outlook of the Cambridge School, according to 
which the attitude of political thinkers can be understood on the basis of their own historical age. 
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their ends by means of differing strategies, which in turn is determined by what concept of 
sovereignty underlies their political moves. 
That explains the key role of prevailing discourses on sovereignty in determining nation state 
interests and making decisions.  
Thus, apart from available resources, what individual states consider to be the ideal nature of 
nation state sovereignty can be regarded as a critical factor. 
2.1.  A discourse theory approach 
Social sciences used to represent a basically “discourse-averse” perspective for a long time 
(Szabó, 1996, p. 103). They considered language an idealised and abstract system of signals 
that could reflect facts and express meanings unambiguously (Shapiro, 1985–1986). 
Later, however, an exclusively abstract linguistic approach was superseded by the 
examination of language also in its social use. This shift shed a new light on language. It was 
no longer seen as an abstract system but something that organised human action and not only 
named but also shaped and organised reality (Carver, 2002, pp. 50–51) 
The linguistic turn eventually brought about a narrative or discursive turn, according to which 
narratives were ways of storytelling fixing and stabilising meanings and creating standard 
contexts (Szabó, 2003, p. 52). 
As a result of the linguistic turn, discourse has become a key concept in contemporary social 
sciences. Discourses are sets of meanings and interpretations referring to historically changing 
themes that create social reality (Miliken, 1999)  
The growing significance of the concept of discourse led to a new avenue of research in social 
sciences known as discourse analysis by the early 1990s.  This approach views the production 
by society of texts as the practice of reality creation (Carver, 2004, p. 144) 
The proponents of the new perspective questioning the exclusivity of the positivist view and 
pointing out the need to use different research methods sought to establish a discipline.  
2.2.  Discourse analysis in political science 
The post-modern perspective of discourse analysis also came into widespread use among 
political scientists as an increasing number of them began to appreciate the significance of 
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language in relation to power (Hajer, 2004, p. 161) and pointed out the importance of 
analysing narratives (Roe, 1994; Fischer – Forester, 1993; Stone, 1997). The political 
analysis of the effects of discourses has become a stable area of mainstream European 
political research (Mottier, 2004, p. 156) 
The representatives of this approach revealed that different narratives are in fact political 
mechanisms themselves as there was no context without stories and no cognitive changes 
without narratives (Hajer, 2004, p. 163). 
It was primarily Anglo-Saxon, North European and Dutch researchers who participated in 
working out political discourse analysis (PDA). Prominent representatives of this school of 
thought include, apart from Terrell Carver, Josef Bleicher; Matti Hyvärinen; and Jacob 
Torfing. In Hungary, Márton Szabó is considered a recognised authority in the field. 
The Department of Government of the University of Essex, England and the Discourse 
Theory Centre of Roskilde University, Denmark stand out as leading institutions. 
Furthermore, PDA is now applied in several groups of the European Consortium for Political 
Research (ECPR) (Szabó, 2004, pp. 139–140). 
Discourse theory as an approach is also used in the field of international relations, where it 
has become a significant perspective through constructivism. Constructivists examine the 
changeability and social embeddedness of international actors’ interests and preferences, for 
which an understanding of the given actors’ system of historical and cultural premises is 
indispensable (Finnemore, 2003; Barnett – Finnemore, 2004). Discourse analysis is no longer 
considered unique even when examining borderline fields like security policy (Katzenstein, 
1996) and environmental protection (Liftin, 1994, 1998). 
The application of discourse analysis to the “Nabucco vs. South Stream” debate in the field of 
energy is a novel feature of the thesis. The starting point of the research is that prevailing 
sovereignty discourses in politics are power factors themselves and thus contribute to shaping 
power relations in the field of supply security. 
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3. THE METHOD APPLIED 
In studying the theme, I performed historical data and document analysis using the theoretical 
approach outlined above, with a focus on applying the techniques of text and discourse 
analysis.  
However, with the discourse theory approach it is to be noted that it is not the method itself 
but the perspective outlined in the foregoing that is considered original. Discursive research is 
inductive in its nature and relies on qualitative techniques. Inductive logic means that the 
research is not about testing hypotheses. Qualitative analysis is based on widely differing 
discourses – texts, speeches, treatises and debates – related to the research theme.  
As opposed to the positivist methodology, discourse analysis is focussed on narratives. Thus, 
research centres on language’s ability to create reality, as opposed to factual data that can be 
derived from individual discourses. Accordingly, I studied rather than filtering out linguistic 
tools (metaphors; similes; enthymemes; etc.) used in texts.  
Contrary to quantitative mathematical-statistical methodologies, I continued data collection 
and data analysis in parallel and iteratively until I reached what is known as “theoretical 
saturation”2.  
Based on Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman, the main parts of qualitative research are as 
follows: 1. reduce, simplify and extract raw data; 2. represent information in an interpretable 
manner; and 3. draw and verify conclusions (Miles – Huberman, 1994, p. 10). 
In my research, I relied on primary and secondary sources. Writings and models prepared by 
seminal thinkers and schools of thought on the subjects of sovereignty; European unification; 
and imperialism can be considered primary sources. In Hungary’s case, my research into the 
gas sector focussed on parliamentary debates; policy-related programmes; and interviews 
with, and opinion articles by, relevant policy makers in the executive and legislative branches 
of power. In my study of the EU and Russia, I relied on official energy policy documents. In 
analysing their energy strategies, I examined the two actors’ energy policy statements. I 
                                                 
2
 The term refers to a state of research where new texts subject to study no longer provide qualitatively new 
information and thus do not contribute to expanding the theoretical framework (Glaser – Strauss, 1967). 
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looked at official energy policy core programmes; strategic documents; directives; and the 
documents of the energy dialogue taking place between them. 
In the case of supply security; import dependency; and diversification projects, I relied on the 
documents of companies relevant to the subject and of internationally recognised research 
institutes, including Gas Infrastructure Europe (Gas Transmission Europe, Transmission 
System Operators, Gas Storage Europe, Storage System Operators, Gas LNG Europe, LNG 
Terminal Operators); British Petroleum (BP); Eurostat; the International Energy Agency; 
the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook; the Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade of 
the Russian Federation (“Tamozhennaia statistika vneshnei torgovli Rossiiskoi Federatsii”); 
and the published materials of Gazprom.
3
 
I used as secondary sources historical articles; studies; analyses; and conference materials 
published on the subjects of European integration and imperialism. In studying the gas sector, I 
made use of different international media, in particular Platts; Bloomberg; Moscow Times; 
NPR; Reuters; International Herald Tribune; the European Energy Review; Eurasianet; 
Robert M. on Energy and Eurasia; Гoлoc Poccии (Voice of Russia); and Kárpátinfó. Of 
domestic media, I drew on the dailies Magyar Nemzet, Népszabadság, Magyar Hírlap, 
Világgazdaság and Napi Gazdaság; the weeklies HVG, Heti Válasz and Figyelő; as well as  
Index.hu, Energiainfo.hu and Portfolio.hu. 
In addition to desk research, I also had access to sources on the internet. During the research, I 
consulted stakeholders and experts in the field as well. 
From the constructivist perspective, the subject can be analysed as a set of complex 
interactions between international and domestic politics. There are a great number of players 
involved in the field of energy; at the same time, based on their influence on decision-making, 
the range of relevant actors can be selected relatively easily. 
At a subsystem (intra-state) level, I studied the public strategic, tactical and communication 
moves of Hungarian energy and foreign policy actors.  With the gas sector, the representatives 
of dominant domestic economic players are also relevant in the study of discourses. The 
behaviour of public opinion is usually changeable, unstable and less coherent and therefore 
                                                 
3
 It has to be noted, though, that energy policy, public or corporate, is informed by data of strategic 
importance and thus it is not easy to evaluate resources as most of them are not available publicly. 
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has a negligible impact on the prevailing foreign policy discourse (Holsti, 1992, p. 442). That 
was why I only covered Hungarian society to a limited extent. 
4. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS 
4.1.  Sovereignty; European integration; and Russian imperialism 
Based on Part II “Theoretical Underpinnings” of my thesis, political theory perspectives can, 
as suggested by Tsimbursky’s dynamic sovereignty model (Tsimbursky, 1992; Tsimbursly, 
1993), be divided into two distinct sovereignty models: a basically pro-cooperation and a 
basically pro-independence model. The primary difference between the two ideal types lies 
in which of the two main “components” of sovereignty is considered ideal for dominance: 
de facto sovereignty or recognition-based sovereignty, and also in what is seen by each 
perspective as the most important goal of the nation state in the case of international 
cooperation. 
Of the de facto and recognition-based components of sovereignty, the collapse of traditional 
and modern empires has by today caused the latter to dominate the European space; however, 
the different schools of thought have differing views of its ideal composition. While, 
depending on their offensive or defensive stance, realist theoretical perspectives consider the 
extension of de facto sovereignty, or the preservation of its existing degree, appropriate, 
liberal schools consider it desirable to increase the recognition-based element of sovereignty. 
With regard to the question of international integration, while the advocates of extending 
recognition-based sovereignty argue for the extension of cooperation, the proponents of 
preserving or extending de facto sovereignty make their case for the independence of the 
nation state. 
Individual perspectives can vary by policy area. We find policies where the State was able to 
act sovereignly and even its own competences were left unquestioned. At the same time, 
depending on the historical age, there are examples of policies in whose case the sovereignty 
of the State was based on some kind of recognition, i.e. assumed a limited or divided 
character. 
In the case of the integration of the European Union, we could see the blending of federal and 
inter-governmental elements, which is reflected in the practical decision-making and 
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institutional systems resulting from the divergent sovereignty concepts and inconclusive 
theoretical debates of pro-cooperation and pro-independence perspectives. 
In Russia’s case, it was not until the 19th or 20th century, i.e. the beginning of the volatile age 
of doctrines, that the question of the ideal nature of sovereignty had emerged in Russian 
political discourse. The questioning of the priority of the de facto sovereignty element could 
not emerge yet at the time. 
Although under Stalin the primacy of de facto sovereignty may have seen successful in the 
empire, the endeavours of Soviet foreign policy leadership over time met with the strong 
resistance and sovereignty endeavours of Central and Eastern European nation states and also 
the opposite pole of the bipolar world order, the United States and its allies. Overall, after 
Stalin’s death the recognition-based sovereignty element gradually superseded the de facto 
element. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fundamental debate in Russia’s case no longer 
revolved around imperialism; it was the ideal composition of sovereignty that posed the 
primary dilemma. Standing on one side are those in favour of the dominance of the de facto 
sovereignty element vis á vis protagonists of the strategy for Russia to extend the recognition-
based component of sovereignty. 
All in all, it can be concluded that nation state sovereignty is essentially a social construct 
changing in space and time. Different approaches are certainly not to be seen as exclusive 
perspectives having eternal validity; rather, they merely reflect the convictions of the key 
actors of international politics who change from time to time. 
4.2.  European integration and Russian imperialism in the gas sector  
In Chapters III. 1 and 2 of my thesis, I explored the question of nation state sovereignty in a 
special field of energy policy, namely natural gas supply security. A discourse theory-based 
approach to this theme allowed me to analyse the changing practice of nation state 
sovereignty in relation to European integration and Russian imperialism.  
Although at the start of European integration the founding treaties already addressed energy 
policy, Community documents still covered the hydrocarbon market to a limited extent in the 
1950s. Initially, instead of Community-level institutions established on functionalist 
principles, it was EC member states – as principal territories from a nation state sovereignty 
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perspective – that sorted out their gas issues in the framework of realistic inter-governmental 
rivalry. 
By the 1970s, EC member states had also realised political risks arising from growing energy 
dependence. As a result of oil crises, they primarily interpreted their supply security problems 
as a dilemma jeopardising their nation state sovereignty and thus attempted to deal with those 
issues basically on their own. That in fact hindered rather than helped to forge a 
Community/Union-wide energy policy based on neoliberal institutionalist principles.  
Although the oil crises had a beneficial effect on Community-level thinking in energy policy, 
they failed to bring about a breakthrough in substantive cooperation; in the so-called realist-
neoliberal institutionalist debate (also) taking place in the gas sector, the former prevailed in 
managing the crises. At the same time, deteriorating Middle-East relations contributed to 
developing bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
While in the 1950s Moscow still looked on hydrocarbons as a decisive means to its imperialist 
ends, i.e. the preservation of the empire’s de facto sovereignty and its extension within the 
COMECON, by the end of the 1960s its internal economic difficulties made it consider 
exporting newly explored reserves no longer exclusively to COMECON countries but also to 
the EC. That was how the deepening of energy links between Western Europe and the Soviet 
Union began.  The process was further accelerated by the 1973 oil crisis. 
Deepening cooperation finally led to a situation where by the 1970s the Soviet Union became 
irreversibly dependent on hydrocarbon exports, which became one of the main hindrances to 
imperial endeavours in the long run. The sharp decline in oil prices combined with the “star 
wars” threat from the United States in the second half of the 1980s also had a part to play in 
limiting the Soviet Union’s trade to the EC and the COMECON. That finally played a key 
role in causing the empire to collapse. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gazprom became the biggest player in the gas 
sector. The concern had a monopoly within the sector but it also had to face severe difficulties 
during the period of transition. It often led to open conflicts between Yeltsin’s political and 
Gazprom’s corporate leadership. 
By contrast, EC member states’ efforts to improve energy efficiency proved to be successful 
by the 1980s. After the energy crisis and a drop in the prices of energy, the dominance of the 
political sphere and nation state interventions was gradually superseded by market economy 
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logic and neoliberal views. That accelerated the process towards placing the EC energy policy 
on a community basis. Europe set as a central objective to reduce prices, which it sought to 
achieve by means of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation.  
In a White Paper issued by the European Commission in 1986, the Community declared that 
the most important task in the field of energy was to create a single energy market, which had 
two preconditions: the establishment of uniform energy networks within the framework of 
trans-European networks and the liberalisation of national energy markets being in a 
monopolistic situation. However, the endeavours included in the Commission directive were, 
in the majority of cases, either watered down due to resistance from nation states or in many 
instances were not realised at all or not to the extent required by the European Commission.   
While the neoliberal institutionalist endeavours of the 1980s and 1990s did not cause supply 
security issues to disappear from the agenda, the weight of the problem diminished. By the 
1990s, the issue of security primarily emerged from an environmental protection aspect. 
As of the 1980s, the development of EU foreign relations was already accompanied by 
practical results realised on the basis of neoliberal principles. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, a number of neoliberal institutionalist steps were taken in the European Union 
by Eastern enlargement resulting in many international agreements and much decision-
making space, to which, however, no meaningful substance was added due to EU member 
states’ divergent nation state interests and Russia’s strategic endeavours. No Community-
level single energy policy was put in place except for a few first steps taken in earnest 
towards one. 
Energy supply risks appeared more frequently in the EU’s strategic documents after 2000 
accelerating the development of regulations promoting a single energy market and of 
programmes supporting infrastructural projects.   
In addition, international discourses now included the need to enhance earlier international 
agreements and decision-making spaces. There were many reasons for this including a 
drastic rise in fossil fuel prices in the mid-2000s; a change in the Russian energy strategy; 
the EU’s Eastern enlargement; and increasingly frequent disputes between Russia and the 
Ukraine over gas prices and their adverse consequences. 
Russia’s energy policy underwent significant changes in Vladimir Putin’s first two terms as 
president. A substantive transformation of the public and economic sectors, in particular the 
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gas industry, began. That also meant the intensification of foreign policy-driven 
protectionist endeavours as opposed to the liberal economic policy in the 1990s. In the case 
of Gazprom, the primary goal became the setting up of a vertically integrated global energy 
concern capable of dominating the entire gas sector from production to reaching the final 
consumer. Following consolidation, the Russian company’s management set increasingly 
ambitious targets as was demonstrated by the Russian energy strategy until 2020 adopted in 
2003. 
4.3. The “Nabucco vs. South Stream” debate (2006-2012) 
Part IV of the thesis focusses on the period 2006–2012, in particular on debates over on 
Nabucco and Russia-inspired alternative pipeline projects (Blue Stream and South Stream). 
The start of the conflict was closely linked to the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in January 2006. 
The disagreement between Moscow and Kiev gave impetus to the implementation of 
Nabucco. The project increasingly took centre stage in discourses on European energy policy. 
The purpose of Nabucco’s implementation pointed beyond EU-Russia relations as leaders 
of the United States was also monitoring developments around the project. That was 
because the USA’s most important aims included the separation of former gas-rich member 
republics from Russia’s sphere of interests. That was how the gas supply security dilemmas 
of Eastern Central European countries and the geopolitical interests of the United States 
came down to a common denominator in the case of the Nabucco project. 
At the same time, however, chances of implementing Nabucco were limited by the unclarified 
question of where gas could come to the pipeline from. Although the US welcomed the 
project, it did not participate in it as an investor, nor was it able to give it a significant boost 
other than a communication offensive. 
Seeing Europe’s loss of confidence in it, Russia attempted to stabilise its regional superpower 
positions in the gas sector.  Moscow therefore sought to achieve the following goals: 
1. Prevent gas-producing countries in the Caspian region from getting their gas directly to 
Europe without Russian control. 
2. Conduct smooth and uninterrupted gas trade with “gatekeeper” states situated between 
Russia and the European Union. 
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3. Regain the confidence of Western European consumers. 
These goals were underpinned by a three-pillar strategy as follows:  
1. Gain/retain a buyer’s monopoly on sources of natural gas extracted in near abroad 
countries. 
2. Gain/increase/keep control over the transit infrastructure by way of obtaining political 
influence or exerting political pressure. 
3. Guarantee secure supply to European gas consumers by initiating natural gas projects 
involving Russian interests. 
Russia began to implement its strategy through a series of complex tactical moves focussed 
on diversifying Russian transit routes or at least on its communication to exert pressure. For, the 
Blue Stream II and, later, the South Stream projects could contribute to four things at the same 
time. They could: 
1. Limit the number of states feeding gas into Nabucco.  
2. Be used to threaten and also discipline “gatekeeper” states serving as Western transit 
routes for Russian gas. 
3. Be an alternative source of supply security for South-East European countries, which could 
weaken the case for implementing Nabucco.  
4. Enable Russia to make the EU recognise Russian energy policy moves by seeking to 
engage Western companies in its own self-devised pipeline projects. 
In respect of the Hungarian debate over the gas pipeline, it can be concluded that despite its 
predominantly foreign policy overtones the conflict also dominated the domestic political 
discourse. Fidesz basically engaged in a value-based debate and discussed events around the 
pipeline projects in the context of sovereignty and loyalty. The opposition party sought to 
pressurise the Gyurcsány administration into “laying its cards on the table”, or at least to 
maintain an air of uncertainty around the government’s position. It did so at the real risk of 
terminating a balanced relationship with Moscow.   
Even though the government pointed out on several occasions that it wished to engage in 
interest-based and pragmatic talks with Russia, the rhetoric and the results achieved in energy 
policy, i.e. the wishes and reality were not going hand in hand. An IHT article publishing 
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Ferenc Gyurcsány’s statement forced the government to remain on the defensive and stand its 
now discredited former ground based on the principle of “the more pipelines, the better”. 
Concurrently, under constant pressure from Fidesz and official and semi-official American 
sources the government inadvertently found itself in the midst of an interest-based 
international debate. All that eventually led to the government’s symbolic step in favour of 
Nabucco. 
In the course of 2009, the “Nabucco vs. South Stream” debate could gradually die down in 
Hungary, for the following reasons: 
1. A change in the official American position: Following the US presidential elections and 
shift in power, the Obama administration adopted a more consensus-seeking and pragmatic 
approach in its Russia policy as opposed to the confrontational stance of the previous 
Republican leadership. Moscow also confirmed improving US-Russian ties in the field of 
energy. Thus, Washington no longer considered Nabucco and South Stream as competing 
options. 
2. Surgutneftegas’s purchase of MOL shares: With Gyurcsány’s “departure”, a key figure of 
the conflicts over the gas pipelines was removed from the centre of the „Nabucco vs. 
South Stream” debate. Besides, the purchase by Surgutnefegas of MOL shares shifted the 
focus of the discourse over Hungary’s energy policy sovereignty from the “Nabucco vs. 
South Stream” debate to the assessment of risks stemming from a Russian stake in MOL. 
3. Settlement of Fidesz-Russian relations: Fidesz’s election success in 2010 became 
increasingly certain by the second half of the 2006–2010 parliamentary term. Thanks to 
that, Fidesz took the first steps towards détente with Moscow in the second half of 2009.  
All that was publicly returned by Moscow before the first round of Hungary’s 
parliamentary elections in 2010. 
4. Growing dominance of alternative projects in international gas supply security discourses: 
Many countries in Eastern Central Europe saw increasing opportunities in ramping up 
alternative transit and production technologies, including in particular a focus on LNG 
imports and non-conventional natural gas extraction, as a means to deal with gas supply 
security problems. All these ideas were connected to the concept of a North-South energy 
corridor supported by both the EU and Eastern Central European member states. 
Regardless of party affiliation, the Hungarian political elite increasingly dealt with 
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promoting the build-up of so-called crossborder capacities. The Eastern European region 
took concerted action in order to develop the gas pipeline infrastructure during Gordon 
Bajnai’s premiership and also continued to do so during the term of the second Orbán 
government. 
Following the study of the “Nabucco vs. South Stream” debate, it can be concluded that in a 
political sense there is no more to it than promoting control over gas transmission routes and 
trade conducted on them. In the case of the discourse under review, business considerations 
are characteristically complemented with a foreign policy conflict pointing beyond the energy 
policy discourse. Ultimately, Nabucco and South Stream have become the symbols and 
yardsticks of two geopolitically distinct sets of goals underpinned by divergent sovereignty 
concepts. 
Nabucco can be viewed as a project designed to weaken Russia’s westbound gas 
transmission positions and as a compass in terms of whether it is possible to get Caspian gas 
to Europe by bypassing Russia. The concept of South Stream serves as a means to preserve 
Russia’s status quo in natural gas transmission. It can be concluded, however, that the 
primary yardstick of the Russia-inspired project lies not in its implementation as such but in 
maintaining or strengthening the current power positions. 
There are a number of reasons why the “Nabucco vs. South Stream” debate has faded into the 
background, including falling European demand for gas and gas oversupply caused by the 
global economic recession; the resetting of US-Russia relations; the prospect of building up 
LNG infrastructure in Eastern Central Europe; and the emergence of European discourse over 
non-conventional natural gas extraction. 
However, in the case of the latter two factors – i.e. projects representing an opportunity to 
diversify gas transmission and extraction – new risks have emerged in respect of the Russian 
gas status quo in Eastern Central Europe. For that reason, the implementation of South Stream 
seemed to make more sense at the end of 2012 than any time before during the history of the 
debate over alternative pipelines as discussed in the foregoing. 
The “Nabucco vs. South Stream” debate clearly demonstrates that different discourses can 
also function as power factors in the field of international relations. In my opinion, shedding 
light on the gas pipeline debates from a discourse theory perspective can have a stimulating 
effect on the domestic and international political, economic and scientific elite in that it 
18 
 
enables it to evaluate a theme so far handled primarily on economic grounds also from 
political aspects; revisit its assumptions and theoretical viewpoints; and thus respond to the 
challenges of transnationalisation affecting the gas sector. 
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